September 25, 2026


Revealing the Supreme Court's Political Past: Insights from Historian Rachel Shelden

In an enlightening discussion on the historical political nature of the U.S. Supreme Court, historian Rachel Shelden dives into the court's first century, challenging the modern perception of its apolitical stance. Her insights, derived from her recent book, "The Political Supreme Court: A Forgotten History," provide a fresh perspective on the judiciary's early years and its evolution into the institution we recognize today.

Shelden explains that the Supreme Court was originally designed as a political entity. In the 19th century, justices were actively involved in politics, often participating in state and local political affairs, running for various offices, and even contributing to legislation and presidential speeches. This involvement was seen as part of their duties rather than a conflict of interest.

One notable example is Justice David Davis, who resigned from the Supreme Court in 1877 to serve as a U.S. Senator from Illinois, viewing it as a position of equal or greater importance. This practice was quite common, as many justices viewed their judicial roles as just one aspect of their public service careers.

The perception of the Supreme Court as an isolated, purely legal institution is a relatively recent development. According to Shelden, this shift began in the late 19th century and continued through the 20th century, influenced by the professionalization of the legal field and a new interpretation of the Constitution as a legal document rather than a political one.

Furthermore, Shelden argues that the landmark 1803 case, Marbury v. Madison, often cited as the moment the Supreme Court asserted its apolitical role, is more myth than reality. This narrative gained traction around the court's 1890 centennial but does not accurately reflect the court's active political involvement in its early years.

Shelden also critiques the contemporary legal theory of originalism, which claims to base its principles on historical practices. She contends that originalism often cherry-picks historical data without engaging with the broader, more complex debates that shaped 19th-century constitutional interpretations.

Understanding the Supreme Court's deeply political roots is crucial for current debates over court reform and legitimacy. It not only informs our interpretation of the court's past decisions but also challenges our expectations of its role in American democracy today.

This historical perspective invites legal scholars, practitioners, and the public to reconsider how we view the intersection of law and politics and what we expect from our highest court.